Digital service platforms are becoming widespread in all areas of society. One risk scenario in platform development is related to the fragmentation of development efforts and the failure to achieve a critical mass of platform users, while a second risk scenario is related to a winner-take-all situation in which one platform firm achieves a monopoly position in the market. We develop a system dynamics model of platform development that includes two competing platforms, and use the model to simulate various development paths by varying different factors that affect how resources accumulate to the platforms. Our simulation results show that delays in users' decision making can increase the likelihood of achieving critical mass. In addition, open interfaces and data transferability between platforms can accelerate platform adoption and decrease the likelihood of a winner-take-all situation. The simulation results also reveal more nuanced development paths than simple S-shaped growth because of delays in platform development and different cross-side network effects to end users and service providers.
Introduction
The application of information and communications technology is reshaping all areas of our society. It can be used to improve productivity and to develop new kinds of services by integrating solutions from different industries, such as energy, mobility, and built environment. For example, the application of information and communications technology in a city environment has been termed 'smart city', and the concept has been approached from a variety of different viewpoints, ranging from technological applications to city infrastructure (Harrison et al., 2010) to new governance and organizational structures enabled by the technology (European Parliament, 2014) . It also presents potential opportunities to introduce digital platforms that enable the flow of information across isolated city and sector specific information systems, which would facilitate an efficient use of resources.
Digital platforms can mediate the flow of information and thus enable the interconnection of products and services, as well as data flows between different actors (cities, service providers, and end users) on multiple sides of a platform. Digital platforms have mostly attracted attention in the context of consumer applications, such as Uber and Airbnb, and academic studies have focused mostly on the context of mobile phones, such as Google's Android platform (Pon et al., 2014 ) and Apple's iPhone platform (Garcia-Swartz and Garcia-Vicente, 2015) . In the future, however, digital platforms can also become important in many other sectors, such as the smart city context. When a community of actors is developing platform-based services in a smart city context, it is important that a critical mass of actors is reached in order to achieve self-sustaining growth. An important question also relates to the degree of openness of these platforms. The evolution of platforms often tends to follow a so-called winner-take-all dynamic where one platform gains dominance and a gatekeeper role. These kinds of situations can be especially problematic in a smart city context if they relate to publicly critical services or infrastructure. This means that interoperability through open and common interfaces and easy exchange of data across platforms can be important factors in enabling competition across platforms and their continuous development.
There are many smart city related sectors where digital platforms could emerge. One example comes from the field of transport. Mobility as a Service can be considered as a new transport paradigm which aims to integrate different modes of transport, such as buses, trains, and shared cars into a service package. As a result, users would not need to have separate accounts and tools for each mode of transportation when planning and paying for their trips. Automatic data gathering could also enable better demand responsive public transportation. The new service concepts could be implemented with the help of a multisided platform, which would link different end user groups, transport operators, and software developers. Recently, a European alliance 1 has been set up to promote the collaboration of various development efforts related to Mobility as a Service in different countries, and some start-up companies as well as more established firms have started to develop such services.
Technological Forecasting & Social Change 117 (2017) 119-130 In this article, we develop a simulation model and use the model to analyse the development and competition of platforms. We use a Mobility as a Service example to illustrate the results. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a review of relevant literature on platforms; in Section 3, we present the methodology used, namely system dynamics modelling; Section 4 describes our simulation model; and Section 5 describes model validation issues; the results of the simulations are presented in Section 6; after which the impacts of policies are analysed in Section 7; finally, our conclusions are presented in Section 8.
Literature review

Achieving critical mass
Gaining a critical mass of end users, developers, and service providers and achieving self-sustaining growth and scalability is a key issue for the success of platforms. Initially, platform development may be financed, promoted, or otherwise subsidised using external funding, but over the long term the success of a platform depends on a viable business model and the ability to attract customers. In the initial phases of platform development, a common problem is a so-called 'chickenand-egg' situation in which too few developers and service providers of a platform inhibit the growth of the end user customer base, and vice versa (e.g. Casey and Töyli, 2012a) . In order to achieve a critical mass, development resources have to be allocated in the right way. If there are many competing and non-interoperable platforms there is the risk that no platform achieves a critical mass. In a smart city context, for example, individual cities may develop fragmented platforms that target only a small set of potential customers, and the number of end users remains low or decreases when publicly funded development efforts end.
Achieving a critical mass and being able to scale up a platform depends crucially on network effects (Katz and Shapiro, 1986 ) created by a platform. Direct network effects refer to situations in which the value for an actor group depends on the size of the same actor group. For example, the value of a social media platform for an end user increases with an increase in the total number of end users. By contrast, indirect (or cross-side) network effects refer to instances in which the value for an actor group depends on the size of another actor group. For example, the value of a mobile phone operating system platform for end users depends on the number of application developers (and the applications developed by them), and vice versa (Garcia-Swartz and Garcia-Vicente, 2015) . Furthermore, in modern internet-based platforms, the role of data is crucial, and network effects due to data accumulation can be substantial.
Understanding network effects is crucial for understanding twosided (and multi-sided) markets, in which a platform mediates transactions between demand and supply side actors. In two-sided markets, a platform owner can subsidise one side of the market in order to increase platform adoption and charge another side of the market instead (Parker and Van Alstyne, 2005) . In other words, the price structure (Rochet and Tirole, 2006 ) matters in addition to the level of pricing. In multi-sided platforms opening boundary resources (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2013) , such as application programming interfaces, can enhance the magnitude of network effects since third parties can integrate their applications to the platform.
The dynamics of platforms are also influenced by other reinforcing feedback mechanisms related to the adoption of technologies and the growth of firms. These include the accumulation of knowledge and informational increasing returns, which have been studied with computational modelling (Safarzyńska and van den Bergh, 2010) and qualitative case studies (Klitkou et al., 2015) . Furthermore, changing societal norms and the practices of consumers, firms, and the public sector can have an important role. Because of old ways of operating, different actor groups might not initially perceive the value of a platform and potential reinforcing feedback mechanisms can thus remain untapped.
Platform competition and winner-take-all markets
In order for firms to have an incentive to take risks and invest in platform development, the platform must be a source of competitive advantage to them. This requires that they must be able to lock in customers to some extent, and thus aiming for excessive openness in platform development may not be the best option. From a platform owner perspective, openness reduces switching costs for users and intensifies competition (Eisenmann et al., 2009) .
However, because of the multiple reinforcing feedbacks in platform based competition, there is a tendency for a winner-take-all scenario to occur in which the market leader is able to harness increasing returns mechanisms and lock out competitors. This can have a negative overall effect on the innovativeness and development of an industry (Gawer and Cusumano, 2014) . Whether or not an industry should be allowed to develop to a winner-take-all situation is an important public policy question. On the one hand, if the clock speed (Fine, 2000) of an industry is fast, it can be argued that monopolies do not last for long because new entrants with better technologies or service concepts can effectively challenge the market leader. On the other hand, platform monopolies can be especially problematic in situations that involve publicly critical infrastructure and services, e.g. related to energy production or transport (parts of the smart city context) with a slow clock speed and long development cycles.
A winner-take-all situation is more likely when network effects are positive and strong, multi-homing costs are high, and there are no differentiation opportunities in the market (Eisenmann et al., 2006) . Rysman (2009) also mentions the possibility for the providers of complimentary goods to differentiate their offerings as a factor that may lead to a winner-take-all situation. In the context of digital platforms, the overall network effects can be strong because of data accumulation to a platform. In addition to this, multi-homing costs can be high due to non-standard development toolkits or application programming interfaces, which result in extensive integration efforts for developers who want to use different platforms. For example, in the context of Mobility as a Service, there could be separate implementations of public transport payment and journey planner applications for each city, and extra costs would be generated to access data across the platforms.
There are also factors that can even out competition and make a winner-take-all situation less likely. One mechanism is the competitive crowding phenomenon in which a large number of developers on a platform decrease innovation incentives because of excess competition (Boudreau, 2011) . Also, competition can increase if the market leader invests less in platform development than competitors (Markovich and Moenius, 2009 ). Finally, a firm can use a platform envelopment strategy in which it leverages assets in one industry in order to gain a competitive advantage in a neighbouring industry (Eisenmann et al., 2011) .
Competition and collaboration in business ecosystems
A group of companies pursuing a business model through a mediating platform can be described as a layered and interconnected value system (Stabell and Fjeldstad, 1998) and involves collaboration and competition between different actors within an ecosystem. However, in order for an ecosystem to develop to this desired state, the risks of the chicken-and-egg scenario (failure to achieve critical mass) and winner-take-all scenario have to be avoided with an appropriate value orchestration strategy and corresponding policies.
Coopetition is a broad concept that includes different types of strategies in which firms both compete and collaborate at the same time. Based on the existing literature, Ritala et al. (2014) have identified four different types of coopetition-based business models: 1) increasing the size of current markets, 2) creation of new markets, 3) improving efficiency in resource utilization, and 4) improving the competitive position relative to firms in another network. These different types of coopetition-based business models are applicable in different industries, but the business model related to the creation of new markets is especially relevant for emerging digital service platforms.
Collaboration through harmonized interfaces between different platforms can increase the size of the overall market and make it easier for the platforms to achieve a critical mass. Harmonized standard interfaces have, for example, been a critical factor in enabling network effects and large economies of scale in the global diffusion of mobile telecommunication networks (Casey and Töyli, 2012b ) and the Internet router infrastructure (Leiner et al., 2009) , which can both be seen as examples of value systems of layered and interconnected platforms. Furthermore, open platforms decrease the risk of vendor lock-in to users, which can increase platform adoption (Eisenmann et al., 2009 ).
Methodology
Applicability of system dynamics to the problem
System dynamics simulation is a methodology that examines how feedback loops, accumulations, and time delays between various factors influence the behaviour of a complex system over time (Sterman, 2000) . Researchers have recently started to conceptualize platforms as dynamic systems and examine how they develop endogenously through time. For example, Casey and Töyli have used system dynamics modelling to examine the historical emergence of mobile telecommunications markets (2012b), as well as platform strategies that result in two-sided platform success or failure (2012a). Zhu and Iansiti (2012) also develop a simulation model to examine how platform quality, indirect network effects, and consumer expectations influence entry into platform-based markets. Building on this emerging stream of literature, we construct a system dynamics model to examine different future scenarios of the development and competition of digital service platforms in the context of the smart city.
Problem definition, scope, time horizon and purpose
We have identified two symptomatic behaviour patterns (reference modes) related to the development of platforms. In the first case, there is an initial period of growth in platform adoption, but this phase is followed by a collapse. In the second case, one platform succeeds to grow and achieves a monopoly position in the market which deters successful market entry from rival platforms.
The purpose of the model is to explain the reasons for these two types of dynamic behaviour and to examine potential policies that could help overcome the problems associated with these behaviours. As these dynamic behaviours can occur in various different settings, our purpose is to build a generic model rather than to focus on the details of a specific context. However, we illustrate our findings in light of the Mobility as a Service platform example.
The time horizon of the model is in the order of multiple years so that both the initial growth phase and the subsequent competition phase between platforms are included in the simulation model outputs. The model includes an endogenous two-sided market of end users and service providers, and the development of two competing platforms based on the resources accumulated by the platform owners.
Formulation of dynamic hypotheses
Based on the existing literature, we have identified different mechanisms that can cause the previously mentioned dynamic behaviour. First, the growth and collapse behaviour can be caused by fragmented development efforts and the failure to achieve a critical mass. Even though a system may contain various increasing returns mechanisms (positive feedback loops), these may not be dominant at the early phases of platform development. Second, the winner-take-all scenario is the result of one platform provider being able to lock-in customers and establish a monopoly position in the market. Once one platform has achieved a critical mass, the increasing returns mechanisms work in its favour and cause path dependencies.
The dynamic hypothesis guiding the model development is that the same feedback structure can account for the two different modes of behaviour. As such, factors that influence the strengths of the different feedback loops can significantly influence the development of platforms. We focus specifically on how platform switching costs to users (due to user data) and delays in users' decision making affect the accumulation of data and financial resources to the platforms. We also examine the effects of two policies: application of open harmonized interfaces across platforms and data transferability between platforms.
Simulation model
Causal loop diagram
The system dynamics model encompasses key feedback loops related to the development of platforms. It includes the three following actor groups: 1) Platform providers, who sell an integrated service concept to end users, 2) End users, who buy services through the platform, and 3) Service providers, who sell their services through the platform. In the context of Mobility as a Service, the service providers would include both transport operators and third party application developers. The main feedback loops of the model are illustrated in Fig. 1 and are explained below:
Platform development (reinforcing feedback loop R1)
Revenues from an increasing number of end users can be invested in further platform development (service concept development and development of technical performance). Platform development increases the value to end users and attracts more end users to adopt the platform.
Data network effect (reinforcing feedback loop R2)
A larger customer base means that more data can be gathered for the purpose of developing the platform. This can enable, for example, better service concepts and price optimizations. Data gathering can include automatic development and tailoring of the services based on machine learning algorithms as well as more traditional development work based on customer feedback. Criteria for data gathering can also be determined more precisely, which improves the usability of collected data. Because of these factors, the service can be tailored more flexibly to a variety of changing user needs, and as a result more end users adopt the platform.
Cross-side network effect (reinforcing feedback loop R3)
More end users provide more business opportunities to service providers and third-party application developers. In the case of the Mobility as a Service platform, service providers include transport operators, and application developers include, e.g. mobile payment or map service developers. As the number of service providers and application developers increases the platform value to end users increases because of a better service coverage and the possibility to integrate more third party applications. This attracts more end users to the platform.
Competitive effort (balancing feedback loop B1)
An increase in a platform's market share of end users can lead to a monopoly situation with high margins and prices, and the incentive of the platform owner to invest resources in further platform development can be lowered. In the long run this can mean that the platform is not as attractive to users, leading to a situation in which users switch to competing platforms. The number of users can decrease until competitive efforts emerge from the platform owner and further investments in platform development are made (or prices are lowered).
Stock-flow diagram
Selection of stocks
The variables in the model can be grouped into three parts. First, the two-sided market includes stock variables of potential adopters and adopters of end users and service providers. Second, the platform resources are divided into stocks of financial and data resources. Finally, the platform value is determined by the quality of the platform, which is based on development efforts. All of these stock variables are calculated separately for two competing platforms, except for the potential adopters that can become adopters of either platform.
Two-sided market
The two-sided market is modelled by extending the Bass (1969) model of innovation diffusion that considers adoption through exogenous efforts (advertising or subsidisation) and adoption from wordof-mouth (Fig. 2) . Here, the stocks of potential adopters and adopters are calculated separately for both sides of the platform, and potential adopters can become adopters of either one of the competing platforms. The adoption rate depends on the value of the platform to the potential adopters (see Section 4.2.4.). The model also includes discards and switching between the competing platforms, which depend on the platform value to adopters.
Platform resources
The platform owner's resources include both financial and data resources (Fig. 3) . Financial resources accumulate through revenues from end user adopters and can be used for platform development or to pay dividends. In the model, we assume that dividends are only paid if the target market share has been reached. The delay in perceiving and reacting to the current market share is modelled using exponential smoothing, and the amount of resources allocated to platform development depends on the gap between the perceived market share and the target market share. As such, firm level decision making is assumed to be boundedly rational (cf. Sterman et al., 2007) . When the target market share is not reached, the decision making heuristic is similar to the 'percent rule' of budget allocation in the model by Farris et al. (1998) . When the target market share is reached, parameter β determines how much the competitive effort is decreased, and as such reflects the complacency of the platform firms.
Like financial resources, data resources also accumulate to the platform owner through the end users' use of the platform. The platform owner can also acquire data from end users switching to the platform. In addition, the model takes into account data erosion, i.e. the value of old data gradually decreases. The amount of data per user is calculated based on the cumulative end user adopters on the platform, i.e. the number of adopters who have adopted at some point and the positive net flows of switchers from other platforms. The assumption here is that when a user switches to another platform, their data stays in the use of the original platform and the platform owner can use the data for further platform development. If the user data is transferable, the data is in addition transferred to the new platform.
Platform value
Resources allocated to platform development depend on the total available financial resources, and the fraction of resources allocated to platform development. The quality of the platform refers to the value of the platform without accounting for network effects or the value of accumulated user data, and it is calculated based on the amount of financial resources invested in platform development. The costs of using and adopting the platform are not modelled separately. Because of technological development and changing end user preferences, the platform quality can eventually erode, which means that sustained investments are required in order to keep the platform value from deteriorating. Accumulated user data in the platform enables more efficient platform development.
The value of the platform to potential end users and service providers depends on the quality of the platform as well as the cross-side network effect. Once an end user has adopted a platform, the platform value depends on the value obtained from user data. If data is transferable between platforms, end users can switch between rival platform providers and retain the value of their user data. We assume that only end users obtain user data, and as such the value of the platform to service provider adopters does not differ from the value to service provider non-adopters.
Testing and validation
We ran several tests that gradually increased our confidence in the model. As the study is forward-looking and the platforms under consideration are still emerging, no quantitative data exist in order to perform thorough behaviour reproduction tests. We thus focus especially on the validity of the model structure with respect to the purpose presented in Section 3. The validation tests are grouped into direct structure tests that do not involve simulation, and structure oriented behaviour tests in which simulation experiments are used (Barlas, 1996) .
We have used Vensim DSS for Windows Version 6.2 (Double Precision) simulation software to run the simulations. The model equations and parameter values are listed in the Appendix A, and the simulation model file is openly available to ensure replicability of our results. The simulations reported in the article were run using time step 0.0625 and Euler numerical integration. The exact numerical values of the simulation outputs change somewhat when the time step or numerical integration method are changed (e.g. RK4 Auto), and in some instances these changes can impact whether or not the tipping point is reached for particular parameter values during the initial growth phase of platform development. However, these are not significant concerning the purpose of the model or their implications to the results presented in the article. In contrast, a smaller time step may be needed under some extreme conditions (e.g. parameters a = 1 and c = 300 simultaneously).
Direct structure tests
The feedback structures of the model have been formulated and extended based on existing literature, such as the Bass model of innovation diffusion. Regarding the level of aggregation, end users and service providers are grouped into potential adopters and adopters. While in reality these could be disaggregated into different end user segments or different types of service providers, for the purposes of the model a simpler structure is more appropriate. Platform resources are disaggregated into financial and data resources because the resource types operate in different ways. Whereas the platform owner can control the expenditure of financial resources through balancing feedback B1, data resources can be used without expending them. Furthermore, data resources can potentially be transferred from one platform to another.
The model includes formulations to ensure that stock variables stay non-negative in extreme conditions and that conservation laws are met. For example, the sum of potential adopters and adopters of competing platforms stays constant at all times.
The behaviour of actors is modelled using boundedly rational decision rules that depend on the information available to the actors at a specific point of time. In other words, we do not assume that they would have perfect foresight of how the platforms and their adoption will develop. End users and service providers make their decisions concerning platform adoption, discarding, and switching based on their perception of the platform's value to them. Likewise, the platform owner's decision to invest financial resources to platform development is modelled using a heuristic that depends on the current market share. We assume that users adopt only one platform at a time, which is a reasonable assumption if multi-homing costs are high, e.g. because of fixed monthly costs to end users instead of a transaction based pricing.
The units of all variables and parameters have been specified, and the model passes a dimensional consistency test. All parameters in the model have meaningful counterparts in the real world. As the purpose of the model is to reveal insights about platforms in general, the exact parameter values are not significant and the parameters are not estimated to represent any specific platform in particular.
5.2. Structure-oriented behaviour tests
Extreme conditions test
The model behaves as expected when individual variables are subjected to extreme conditions. For example, setting the number of adopters to zero results in zero platform value, and setting the amount of financial resources to zero results in no improvement in platform quality. The model also behaves plausibly when individual parameters are set to the limits of their meaningful ranges of variation as well as when several parameters are varied simultaneously in a Monte Carlo experiment.
Sensitivity analysis
The model produces different types of dynamic behaviour when different model parameters are varied, and the model is able to endogenously generate the two symptomatic dynamics motivating the study, namely the growth and collapse pattern (i.e. 'chicken-and-egg' situation) and the winner-take-all pattern.
Several model parameters affect whether self-sustaining growth in platform development is achieved. We tested the effects of various model parameters in the initial growth phase by switching off the balancing feedback loop B1 in these situations, which corresponds to full competitive effort. Initially, an external advertising effort is required, and the advertising time needs to be long enough in order to reach a tipping point. Similar results have been reported in existing studies (e.g. Struben and Sterman, 2008) . The necessary duration depends on the effectiveness of advertising (parameter a) and the contact rate (c) between adopters and potential adopters: high values mean that the necessary advertising time is shorter. Similarly, if there are initially ample financial resources it is easier to reach critical mass.
In addition, a critical mass is more difficult to reach if the value of substitutes is high with respect to the platform value (i.e. high values of the reference platform value V*). The model also includes parameters that determine the reference values for the adopter fraction (af*) and the reference time for data accumulation (T*). Large values of these parameters imply that more adopters and more data are needed in order to obtain the same level of benefits and therefore make it more difficult to achieve a critical mass.
The model equations contain exponents that determine the effect of data resources on platform development productivity (γ) and the indirect network effect strength (α). High values imply that platform value is strongly dependent on the availability of data and the number of adopters on the other side of the platform. In the beginning when there is a lack of data and adopters, high values of these parameters can therefore make it more difficult to reach a critical mass.
In some simulations close to the tipping point, the adoption fraction decreases momentarily after the initial advertising period but afterwards continues to grow. This type of dynamic behaviour is possible if the effectiveness of platform development depends strongly on the amount of data accumulated (high values of γ).
The decisions of a platform owner can influence whether the platform gains a monopoly position in the market. A winner-takeall scenario occurs if the competitive effort does not strongly depend on the market share (large values of the target market share M* and small values of β) or if the platform firms react slowly to changes in market shares (large values of the platform owner reaction time τ′). In these situations, the balancing feedback loop B1 operates only weakly. For small values of the platform owner reaction time, the cycles in market share occur at a faster pace and the amplitude of market share oscillations is smaller. This is consistent with the general theoretical finding that a delay in a balancing feedback loop causes oscillation within a dynamic system (Sterman, 2000) . Also, as expected, strong network effects (high values of α) or a strong dependence of platform development on the availability of data (γ) increase the likelihood of a winner-take-all scenario by increasing the strength of the reinforcing feedback loops.
Simulations and behaviour discussions
Using the model, we are able to simulate the two identified behaviour modes. First, in the fragmented development scenario, the market share of the platforms initially grows due to development and advertising efforts. However, a critical mass of end users is not achieved that would generate self-sustaining growth. As a result, the number of end users eventually decreases and the platform value does not increase significantly. Second, in the winner-take-all scenario two competing platforms initially develop nearly identically, but after a certain point one platform is able to successfully accumulate resources to the extent that there is no room in the market for the competitor. In terms of platform value, this scenario can be considered an improvement over the previous scenario, but the increase in platform value saturates after a monopoly position is reached in the market.
Resource accumulation and erosion
A key factor that affects the development of the platforms in our simulation experiments is the rate at which financial and data resources accumulate to the platform. If the rate of resource accumulation (parameter ra) is high, it is easier for a platform owner to gather enough resources to be able to reach a critical mass and thus avoid the growth and collapse pattern that is related to fragmented development efforts. However, a high rate of resource accumulation makes it more difficult for a competing platform to challenge the market leader, thus making the winner-take-all situation more likely.
Similarly, achieving a critical mass is easier if platform resources or platform quality erode only at a low rate (i.e. low values of the fractional erosion of platform resources (re) or platform quality (qe)). By contrast, the effects of resource and quality erosion on platform competition are more complex. At high values of qe or re or when the effect of data on platform development (γ) is high, increases in qe or re can lead to a more pronounced winner-take-all situation because the challenging platform firm cannot accumulate enough resources for effective platform development. However, at low values or when γ is low, increases in re and qe can enhance competition among platform firms because the resources and platform quality of the market leader erode the most. In reality, high values of resource or quality erosion would correspond to situations in which data obsoletes at a high rate, financial resources are used to pay dividends instead of investments into platform development or changing technological requirements or consumer preferences rapidly obsolete previous development efforts.
User reaction time
A key finding in our simulation experiments was that delays in platform users' decision making and reaction affect the rates at which resources accumulate to the platforms. In the model, user related delays encompass delays in users' information processing and decision making. We assume that the user delays are the same for platform discarding and switching between platforms. If adopters can easily discard the platform, the platform owner cannot accumulate development resources as effectively. Also, it is more difficult to obtain benefits from network effects that would attract more adopters to the platform. Because of this, achieving critical mass is more difficult when user reaction times are short (low values of parameter τ). Short user reaction times correspond to situations in which adopters make quick decisions based on their perceived value of the platform, e.g. because of short term contracts for end users or low sunk costs for service providers who have adopted the platform.
The simulation results in Fig. 4 show that when the user reaction time is short, the adopter fraction grows at a slower rate. There is a critical threshold value for the adopter reaction time. For low values (τ = 0.5 in the figure) , the platform adoption fraction drops after the external advertising campaign ends. Self-sustaining growth is achieved for larger values (τ=0.75 in the figure) when the advertising efforts last for a sufficiently long time. If the advertising time T is longer, the tipping point is reached at lower values of τ. The exact threshold value depends on various other factors. When the adopter reaction time is very small (close to zero), the tipping point can still be reached if the advertising effectiveness (a) is very large at the same time.
As such, the simulation results reveal an important trade-off between the ease of end user and service provider adoption and discarding. On the one hand, possibilities for easy, low cost, and short term experimentation with the platform can make initial advertising campaigns more effective and increase platform adoption. On the other hand, these factors can also decrease the reaction time of adopters and increase the discard rate once external advertising campaigns end.
User delays also affect the competition between rival platforms. Once one platform has gathered a critical mass, short user reaction delays can mean that it is more difficult for a rival platform to accumulate resources and challenge the market leader. As such, short user time delays can increase the likelihood of a winner-take-all situation.
Policy design and evaluation
Policies
We will now consider two policies, i.e. open interfaces and data transferability between platforms, and examine how they change the simulation results. Open interfaces can be realized in different ways on a technical level, e.g. by interconnecting the platforms so that end users of one platform can access service providers using another platform or by opening harmonized application programming interfaces to all platforms, which makes it easier for service providers to connect to all platforms and multi-home between them. In the categorization of platform strategy decisions related to openness by Eisenmann et al. (2009) , these correspond to the decisions related to interoperability between rival platforms (horizontal strategy decision) and decisions concerning exclusive contracts for service providers (vertical strategy decision).
In the simulations with open interfaces, we assume that end users also benefit from service providers who have adopted a rival platform. We further assume symmetry in open interfaces, i.e. if platform 1 is interoperable with platform 2, platform 2 is also interoperable with platform 1, and that end users do not incur any additional costs (such as roaming costs).
The second policy, data transferability, is related to both data ownership issues (whether the data is owned by the platform provider or the user) as well as standards for transferring data from one platform to another in an automatized way. As such, data transferability is related to users' switching costs from one platform to another.
Evaluation
Without open interfaces or data transferability, the simulation model produces two basic scenarios (fragmented development and winner-take-all). A third scenario emerges when open interfaces are available. In the collaboration and competition scenario there are two rival platforms that are both able to harness network effects and accumulate resources. In terms of the platform value for users this scenario results in the best outcome. The reason is that while in the winnertake-all scenario the market leader can reduce competitive effort and investments into platform development and still lock-in customers, in the collaboration and competition scenario the competitive rivalry between platform operators ensures that both firms keep investing in platform development in order to attract customers. Fig. 5 summarizes the three possible scenarios related to platform development and competition.
Effects of policies during initial growth phase
The availability of open interfaces positively influences the growth rate of platform adoption (Fig. 6) . The reason is that due to open interfaces end user adopters of one platform benefit from service provider adopters of a competing platform. Thus the users benefit from a greater cross-side network effect. As a result, the end user adopter fraction is greater. There is still a critical tipping point to be reached, but it is reached more easily (compare Fig. 6 with Fig. 4) . Open interfaces between rival platforms thus enable cooperation between platforms as the platform owners benefit from the development and advertising efforts of their competitors.
The effect of data transferability is similar. When user data can be transferred from one platform provider to another platform development is faster, as data accumulated from a rival platform can also be used. Also, end user adoption is faster because of the possibility to switch to a better platform and still retain the benefits of accumulated user data.
In addition, the availability of open interfaces or the possibility to transfer data between platforms creates more subtle effects in the simulations because they create differences between the platform values to end users and service providers. With open interfaces, the cross-side value to end users depends on the total number of service providers on all platforms, but for service providers the cross-side value depends on the end users of the same platform. The transferability of data means that end users continue to benefit from their accumulated data even if they switch platforms, and as such can cause differences between the platform value to end users and service providers. Because of accumulated user data, the value of the platform to end user adopters can exceed that of end user non-adopters and service providers.
In some simulations the adoption fraction of end users continues to grow after the advertising campaign, but then declines. In some simulations the end user adoption fraction continues to grow again after the declining phase (Cluster 1 in Fig. 7 ), but in some other simulations the end user adoption fraction declines to zero (Cluster 2 in Fig. 7) . In these cases, the adoption fraction of service providers starts to decline after the initial advertising campaign, and depending on the values of other parameters either causes the number of end users to decrease or eventually starts to increase because of a large number of end users.
The implications of these findings are that it is important for the platform manager to monitor the adoption of the different sides of the platform. Also, it may be beneficial in these situations to concentrate efforts on subsidising and obtaining service providers to adopt the platform and retain adoption.
Effects of policies on platform competition
The availability of open and harmonized interfaces increases the cross-side network effects for both platforms, but at the same time the competitive advantage of cross-side network effects relative to the rival platform is weaker. As a result, the competition between rival platforms is more even. The winnertake-all scenario occurs only rarely, but can still emerge in situations in which the balancing feedback loop B1 operates only weakly, i.e. in situations in which the competitive effort of the market leader does not decrease significantly (high values of M* and low values of β).
The effect of data transferability is dependent on the effect of user data on end user value (parameter γ′), which in the model increases differences in the platforms' market shares in end users and service providers. When the effect of user data on end user value is low, increasing data transferability increases competition between platforms (can avoid a winner-take-all situation and makes competition cycles faster). However, the results are more nuanced when the effect of user data on end user value is high. Fig. 8 shows the simulation results with a high effect of user data on end user value (γ′ = 3). In these simulations, increasing data transferability (θ) accelerates the competition between platforms. However, when data transferability is low, the platforms are able to retain end users since the end users would lose a significant part of the value if they switched to a rival platform. Increases in data transferability can thus make it easier for the market leader to attract more end users in the short term. In the longer term, however, a high level of data transferability makes it easier for another platform firm to challenge the market leader. By contrast, moderate levels of data transferability (θ = 0,5 in the figure) can lead to a more pronounced winnertake-all situation. In the simulations, increasing the value of θ decreases differences in the platform's market shares with respect to end users and service providers. This is because the service provider adopters do not gain value directly from user data.
Figs. 9 and 10 show the effects of data transferability in the case of open interfaces. Similar to the results without open interfaces, increases in data transferability accelerate the competitive cycles in platform market shares. The simulation results also show that the market shares of the two platform firms can stabilize at different levels if the effect of user data on value is high (γ′ = 3) and no data is transferable between platforms (θ = 0). The figures show the effect of partial data transferability (θ = 0.5) but the results are qualitatively similar for full data transferability (θ = 1).
Conclusions
Summary of findings
This article presents a system dynamics simulation model of platform development and platform based competition. Using the model, we illustrate three possible scenarios related to platform development: 1) the fragmented development ('chicken-and-egg') scenario in which no platform achieves a critical mass, 2) the winner-take-all competition scenario that reflects a vendor lock-in to a single dominant platform, and 3) the Fig. 8 . Effect of data transferability on the end users and service providers of platform 1 (no open interfaces; high effect of user data on end user value, γ′=3). collaboration and competition scenario in which several platforms coexist in balanced competition. We also examine specific factors affecting the likelihood of these scenarios. Even though our study was motivated by an example from the field of transport (Mobility as a Service), the findings are applicable to a wide range of digital platforms across different industries, such as energy, built environment, or environmental monitoring.
Regarding the challenges during the initial platform growth phase, the concept of a tipping point is well known in innovation adoption (Phillips, 2007) , and existing research has identified factors, such as the length of initial advertising efforts (e.g. Struben and Sterman, 2008) , which determine whether the tipping point is reached. However, other mechanisms that affect the tipping point have not been systematically examined in the existing literature, particularly in the presence of network effects and competing firms. Our simulation results suggest that if platform adopters are able to react very quickly, achieving a critical mass may be difficult because the platform firms cannot accumulate enough resources for sufficient platform development. Also, the initial growth phase can be accelerated through open interfaces (that reinforce cross-side network effects) as well as the ability to transfer user data among competing platforms (through faster platform development and end user adoption).
In respect to the different types of competition between platforms, the role in increasing returns mechanisms in creating lock-ins in an economy has been recognized since the work of Arthur (1989) . Our study contributes to this stream of literature by focusing on the effect of data in generating increasing returns mechanisms, which are highly relevant in the context of modern internet-based service platforms. Specifically, our simulation results reveal that in general increased data transferability can accelerate the competitive cycles between platform firms, but in the short term increased data transferability can improve the position of the dominant platform because lower switching costs make it easier for end users to switch to the market leader. In the long term the same effect is possible when the level of data transferability is moderate.
Furthermore, short user reaction times can strengthen the market leader's competitive advantage because of the rival's difficulties in accumulating enough resources for platform development, and thus lead to a winner-take-all situation. Finally, the erosion of platform quality and platform owner resources have effects through two separate mechanisms. On the one hand, the same fractional erosion rate has a larger effect on the market leader, thus evening out competition. On the other hand, a very high erosion rate makes it difficult for firms to accumulate enough resources to challenge the market leader.
Managerial and policy implications
Although the simulations present a simplified version of platform evolution, they point out the importance of striving toward an open environment where actors both collaborate and compete. Our simulation results support the findings from other industries, such as mobile telecommunications, that harmonized open interfaces can enhance competition between platforms because they decrease multi-homing costs for service developers and weaken the lock-in effect due to cross-side (indirect) network effects. As our simulation results reveal, the use of open interfaces and data transferability have benefits for platform firms as well, particularly in the early growth phase.
An important policy and managerial question is how to promote open interfaces and data transferability. For the public sector it is important to strive toward policies that encourage actors to use open interfaces and standardized ways to transfer user data. The public sector could even use strict measures such as regulation to mandate the use of open and harmonized interfaces, where appropriate. Strict measures could be justified especially in smart city application areas that involve critical societal infrastructure, in which a monopoly position by a single platform firm might undermine democratic decision making in society.
A core issue is whether in the future users will be able to control and transfer their data across platforms or will their data be centralized in one monopoly platform provider. Corresponding policy measures are thus needed to ensure ownership and transferability of user data for the platform users. For example, in the case of Mobility as a Service, the data would include data about users' mobility and transport needs and preferences. A related concrete policy measure is the current General Data Protection Regulation with which the European Commission intends to give citizens back control of their personal data within the European Union.
2 The aim of the regulation is that a person could transfer their personal data from one platform to another in a structured and commonly used electronic format.
Our simulation results also reveal that the initial growth phase can follow more complex patterns than simple S-shaped growth. Because of slow platform development in the beginning due to a lack of data, platform adoption can decline after initial advertising efforts but continue to grow later. Other reasons for these types of dynamic behaviours are differences in end user and service provider adoption rates because of differences in cross-side platform values and the value generated by user data. In terms of managerial and policy implications, these results highlight the risks of judging too early either that the development of a platform will fail completely, or that a platform has already gathered a critical mass and external development efforts are no longer needed. The latter risk is especially salient if the growth of only one platform side is monitored.
Limitations and directions for future research
In this article, we have examined the case of platforms that offer an integrated service to consumers and benefit from the accumulation of user data, but in which the service providers do not directly benefit from user data. As such, a limitation of our results is that they might not apply in the case of different business models that platform based companies might use in the future.
An important topic for future research would be to empirically test and validate the results that we obtained through our simulation experiments. In addition, as our model was built as a generic model of digital platforms, it does not offer specific policy advice regarding individual platforms in specific contexts. Therefore in future research, the model could be parametrized and developed further to examine the specifics of individual platforms in more detail. The model that we have presented could also be developed further in a number of ways. Additional feedback loops could be added, such as the scale effect in which an adequate service level is economically feasible for the platform provider only if a certain volume of end users is reached.
In addition, some parts of the current model could be disaggregated. For example, the different cross-side network effects between different types of service providers and third party application developers could be modelled in more detail in order to take into account the different types of value generated by different types of actors in an ecosystem. This would allow a more detailed analysis of how development resources should be allocated in the case of a multi-sided market (finding out which cross-side network effects would be easiest to activate in order to achieve a critical mass, after which other cross-side network effects could be activated more easily). Future research could also examine how the competitive dynamics between different platforms depend on the number of platform firms. For example, increasing the number of competing firms may, under certain conditions, produce chaotic results instead of a smooth pattern or oscillation between fixed points (cf. Farris et al., 1998) .
Appendix A. Model equations and parameter values
The equations and parameter values of the model are shown in the tables below, categorized into three groups: Table A1: Two-sided market,  Table A2 : Platform resources, Table A3 : Platform value. In the equations, subscript s refers to the platform side (1: end users, 2: service providers) and subscripts i and j refer to the competing platforms. The implementation of the model in Vensim simulation software includes some formulations, e.g. to ensure that stock variables stay non-negative and to ensure mass balance. For clarity, these have been omitted in the equations. See the simulation model file for details. 
Value to non-adopters (end users) Value of j to adopters of i -18a
Value to adopters (service providers) V′ 2,i,j =V 2,j -18b
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